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This special issue presents papers from a workshop conducted by New Technologies and Work (NeT-
Work) to honor the memory of Bernhard Wilpert, the founder and organiser of NeTWork. The papers
reﬂect the theme that undesirable incidents and events, serious and disturbing as they may be, are a ‘‘gift
of failure.” In short, events offer an opportunity to learn about safe and unsafe operations, generate pro-
ductive conversations across engaged stakeholders, and bring about beneﬁcial changes to technology,
organization, and mental models (understanding). Papers in the special issue are organised around three
topics: the process of event analysis, the relationship between event analysis and organisational learning,
and learning at multiple system levels. In this introduction we describe the workshop, summarize the
contributions of Bernhard Wilpert, suggest three themes that emerged from the workshop, and offer
our thoughts about the future of event analysis and learning from events.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Background to the special issue
The same wondrous technologies that underlie our modern
societies, such as air and sea transportation, nuclear power, and
health care, also lead to challenges to safety: their innovativeness
and complexity makes them difﬁcult to predict and control (Beck,
1992; Perrow, 1984; Rollenhagen, this issue). As well, organiza-
tions ‘‘push the limits” for greater productivity with more complex,
software-intensive systems that require interdependent participa-
tion from multiple professionals. The public demands more safety
at the same time as it demands more services at less cost, while
corporate shareholders demand higher returns. These issues are
of great importance in so-called ‘‘high-hazard” industries where a
rare and surprising event can place hundreds or thousands of peo-
ple at risk, however, they are also of importance in settings such as
health care and ordinary workplaces where undesired events occur
more frequently but lives are disrupted one at a time.
Organizations need appropriate structures, rules, and practices
to avoid and respond appropriately to safety relevant events, in
order to ensure their safety and reliability. These structures and
rules are the safety management system that is based on both
anticipatory feed-forward models of risk and strategies for feed-
back control (Rasmussen, 1990). Of course, we cannot completely
specify all risks: even if risks are speciﬁed within the operatingll rights reserved.envelope, in real life organizations sometimes operate beyond their
operating envelope (some scholars would say, all the time). There-
fore, adequate feedback control relies on learning from operational
experience. Organizational weaknesses and latent failures (e.g.,
Reason, 1997) are identiﬁed by continual monitoring and system-
atic analyses of problems, deviations, defects, events, near-misses
and organizational surprises. Results of event analyses should lead
to new knowledge, new structures, new rules, and new practices
with the goal of higher reliability and safety. The systematic anal-
ysis of events, using valid and comprehensive methods, is thus a
critical starting point for learning with the goal of enhancing safety
and reliability.
2. The NeTWork workshop: event analysis and learning from
events
NeTWork is an informal group of academics and practitioners
focused on New Technologies and Work (hence the acronym).
Founded in 1982 by Bernhard Wilpert at the Berlin Institute of
Technology (formerly the Berlin University of Technology) with
his colleagues and students, NeTWork has held annual workshops
on a variety of topics. Bernhard Wilpert was the architect of NeT-
Work; he guided the special nature of the workshops, in which dis-
cussion was central and participants were an engaging mix of
workshop veterans and newcomers, researchers and practitioners.
He championed the publication of books and special issues to
document and disseminate the results of the workshops, which
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leadership and engagement also attracted support by various
foundations.
In 1995, NeTWork convened a workshop on the topic ‘‘After the
event – from accidents to organizational learning” and published a
book with the contributions from the workshop (Hale et al., 1997).
However, following more than a decade of experience with various
event analysis methods, it seems that the promises of event anal-
ysis and organizational learning were only partly kept. We still
have to cope with both novel events and so-called recurring events,
one recent example being NASA’s loss of the space shuttle Colum-
bia, with causes reminiscent of the Challenger disaster. Could it be
that our analysis methods do not discover the underlying causes of
the events, or does learning from experience not work as it is sup-
posed to do, or is learning happening in the wrong places?
NeTWork, with the generous support of the Fondation pour une
Culture de Sécurité Industrielle (Toulouse), therefore held a work-
shop in August 2008 with approximately 30 participants, including
both scholars and practitioners. The title of the workshop was
‘‘Event Analysis and Learning from Events.” The goals of the work-
shop were:
 To discuss and reﬂect on various approaches to event analysis
and learning from operating experience that can enhance
safety.
 To develop new theory, new testable hypotheses, new policies,
and new practices that would advance both safety research and
practice.
 To structure a publication (this special issue) based on the pre-
sentations and discussion at the workshop that captures the
insights from the workshop conversations and sets a bold
agenda for future research, management, and policy.
 To honor the memory of Bernhard Wilpert, founder and cham-
pion of NeTWork, whose many contributions to human factors
and social science research included an enduring interest in
event analysis and learning from operating experience.
3. The contributions of Bernhard Wilpert
Bernhard Wilpert was a leading scholar and researcher in ap-
plied social science for four decades and Professor at the Berlin
Institute of Technology for almost three decades. Among his many
contributions as a community builder (along with founding NeT-
Work), he served as president of the International Association of
Applied Psychology and editor-in-chief of its journal Applied Psy-
chology: An International Review. His research was always interna-
tional and interdisciplinary in scope. His early work included path-
breaking studies of managerial participative decision making in
eight countries and national industrial democracy in twelve coun-
tries. In 1990 Bernhard founded the Research Centre for System
Safety at the Berlin Institute of Technology and shortly thereafter
began work on nuclear power plant safety. He developed and dis-
seminated a holistic socio-technical system approach that ex-
tended human factors to comprise human action on all system
levels. The Research Centre developed a methodology for the sys-
tematic analysis of events (Safety through Organizational Learning,
or SOL, see Fahlbruch and Schoebel, this issue) that is widely used
in the nuclear industries of Germany and Switzerland.4. The special issue
This special issue assembles eleven papers derived from the
NeTWork workshop and adds two additional papers, one by Michal
Tamuz and colleagues on a case study of a hospital trying to learn
from a serious incident, and the second prepared by Babette Fahlb-ruch and Markus Schoebel as a tribute to Bernhard Wilpert,
describing the SOL methodology that he developed with his
colleagues.
The thirteen papers represent a range of topics and approaches
consistent with the theme that undesirable incidents and events,
serious and disturbing as they may be, are a ‘‘gift of failure.” In
short, events offer an opportunity to learn about safe and unsafe
operations, generate productive conversations across engaged
stakeholders, and bring about beneﬁcial changes to technology,
organization, and mental models (understanding). We deﬁne
‘‘events” broadly as occurrences of unexpected, undesirable system
states, with or without negative consequences. Thus, ‘‘events” in-
clude incidents, accidents, near-misses, and other organizational
surprises (Koornneef and Hale, 2004).
The special issue organizes the papers into three main topic
areas. First, there are papers that primarily focus on the process
of event analysis, which is the later reconstruction of the occur-
rence of the event as well as of its causes, i.e. the identiﬁcation
of WHAT happened, HOW it happened, and WHY it happened.
Lin et al. describe the development of an accident model in aviation
in several countries; Kirwan describes an air trafﬁc management
investigation and the migration of risk following mitigation efforts;
Rollenhagen discusses event investigations in the Swedish nuclear
power industry; Fahlbruch and Schoebel describe an event analysis
method being used in the Swiss and German nuclear power indus-
try; and Jorgensen describes a simple approach to workplace acci-
dents being used in Denmark.
The answers to the WHAT- and HOW-questions require a de-
tailed description of the course of the event, whereas for the
WHY-question the analyst has to go beyond the given information,
i.e. make causal inferences. As shown in the papers in this issue by
Lin et al., Kirwan, and Rollenhagen (among other), in the past few
decades event analysis has become increasingly sophisticated and
systemic. The MTO (Man–Technology–Organization) framework,
for example, encourages a comprehensive approach to investiga-
tion and analysis. Similarly, newer frameworks move beyond the
classic chain-of-events model to consider the conditions and sys-
tem factors that underlie these events. Even more recently, system
safety models are being developed and applied to examine the en-
tire system from front-line operators and controllers to regulators
and legislators (Fahlbruch and Schoebel, Leveson, both in this is-
sue). At the same time, we must remain mindful of the practical
concerns of users with limited time and resources and the most
effective opportunities for learning. Must every event be analyzed
to the same depth, and must every event have recommendations,
regardless of the level of understanding of the event? Jorgensen
(this issue), for example, sets simplicity and usability as key crite-
ria for use, while directing attention to what can be learned from
‘‘simple” workplace accidents that harm far more people than
the rare major events; many other papers are explicit about bal-
ancing clarity and simplicity with depth and comprehensiveness.
The second set of papers examines the relationship between the
event analysis process and organizational learning. Stockholm
examines obstacles to identifying and learning from common cau-
sal patterns in the reﬁning and chemical industry; Schoebel and
Manzey argue that event analysts have a trained incapacity to
see the motives of individuals and the workings of social systems;
Leveson questions assumptions about reliability and accident anal-
ysis that interfere with learning, offering a systems thinking ap-
proach to safety as a control problem; Wahlstrom identiﬁes
challenges to learning in the nuclear power industry and offers a
conceptual model to support improvement and learning; Tamuz
et al. examine a single case in detail of how departments within
a hospital learned different lessons from an event; and Ramanujam
and Goodman describe the mechanisms that share, store, and re-
trieve learning in organizations.
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yses to make improvements and avoid further problems, the event
analysis process also helps professionals and managers think dif-
ferently about safety, see differently, and update their mental mod-
els (Leveson, Schoebel and Manzey, Stockholm, all in this issue).
Further, participation in the event analysis process can provide
cross-discipline and cross-organization learning and the develop-
ment of trustful relationships that build a supportive environment
for operations and improvement. However, the transition from
written report to organizational learning remains problematic
(Carroll et al. 2006). The gap between analysis and implementation
is considerable and poorly understood (Rollenhagen, Wahlstrom,
both in this issue). When analyses and recommendations are not
understood, not implemented properly, or implemented with dis-
appointing or unknown results, there is erosion of trust and com-
mitment to the quality of reporting, analysis, and learning.
The third set of papers extends the concept of organizational
learning to multiple levels of learning, including how larger sys-
tems and institutions learn. Lindoe et al. show that learning from
accident investigations in offshore petroleum, ﬁsheries, and bulk
carriers depends on the competence of industrial actors interacting
with the characteristics of the regulatory and legal system; and
Hovden et al. describe features of the accident investigation, fol-
low-up, and institutional context that allowed learning within
and across aviation, marine, and rail transport sectors. Both papers
show that it takes years for investigations of major accidents to re-
sult in changes at the system level (typically involving the legal,
regulatory, and legislative processes). Extending our understand-
ing of learning to encompass individuals, companies, industries,
and authorities (even in a global context) is a substantial challenge.
One major role of regulators is to encourage learning across orga-
nizations in the regulated industry. In nuclear power, for example,
industry organizations including INPO andWANO play a major role
in disseminating lessons learned, establishing principles and stan-
dards, and assisting individual organizations to self-assess and im-
prove. Commercial aviation is another example of an industry that
has become expert at collecting information from both near-miss
incidents and major events and then transferring knowledge across
the entire industry.5. Themes
The special issue contributions offer a rich set of stories, obser-
vations, insights, analyses, hypotheses, and recommendations. The
reader can mine these papers for many practical and provocative
ideas. We highlight just three of the cross-cutting themes and is-
sues that are discussed in many of the papers.5.1. Better tools for incident investigation are possible
All too often, incident investigation is informal, ad hoc, and
lacking systematic data and analysis. Even worse, our human ten-
dency to blame the guilty and a legal system focused on liability
(e.g., Hovden et al., this issue) can inhibit current and future learn-
ing. Considerable progress has been made in developing frame-
works such as the Man–Technology–Organization framework
(Rollenhagen, this issue) and understanding that a chain-of-events
analysis is only the beginning to identifying organizational and
systemic factors underlying the events (Fahlbruch and Schoebel,
Leveson, both in this issue). The ‘‘cause” does not lie at the start
of the chain of events (if there is a beginning) but rather in seeing
the chain of events as a symptom of underlying system ﬂaws. Yet
we must contend with the tension between deep and sophisticated
tools and the pressures for timely response from the investigators.
Hence, papers present both relatively new thinking on systemsafety (Leveson, this issue) and practical tools emphasizing sim-
plicity and usability (Jorgensen, this issue) as well as those that
strike a balance in various ways (e.g., Lin et al., this issue).
5.2. Analysis is not learning
The tools for gathering information and analyzing the what,
how, and why of incidents and accidents are but means to the de-
sired ends. The intent of these activities varies among goals of
assigning liability, understanding operations, minimizing disrup-
tions, improving productivity, increasing safety, avoiding future
problems, developing comprehensive tools and theories, and so
forth. Although organizations may choose whatever goals they ﬁnd
consistent with their identity and strategy, we assert in this special
issue that learning is of special importance. For us, learning in-
cludes both understanding and action. If no one behaves differ-
ently, learning has not occurred; yet if new behaviors are not
accompanied by new understandings, then learning cannot be ro-
bust and sustainable across time and ever-changing circumstances.
Tamuz et al. (this issue) relate an example in which separate
groups had decided on corrective actions even before the ofﬁcial
investigation began. Hovden et al. and Wahlstrom, among others
in this issue, discuss the challenges of implementation, that is,
turning the lessons of incident investigation into concrete change.
Kirwan (this issue) labels the ‘‘killer question” as ‘‘How do we
know our countermeasures are the right ones?” Ramanujam and
Goodman (this issue) show that learning requires additional orga-
nizational processes to ensure that lessons are stored and retrieved
when needed.
5.3. Learning requires new mental models and new conversations
The best investigation tools, guidelines, checklists, frameworks,
and routines for training, communicating, and practicing root
cause analysis are necessary but not sufﬁcient for learning. As
Leveson (this issue) points out, safety is managed by control ac-
tions taken by human or technological controllers who must con-
tain a model of the process being controlled. For human
controllers, there must be mental models that portray the con-
trolled processes with sufﬁcient ﬁdelity and understanding of feed-
back to permit control. Leveson, Kirwan, Schoebel and Manzey, and
Stockholm (all in this issue) also discuss mental models. In this
way of thinking, incident investigations are a form of feedback to
managers, regulators, and others about the system. If the audience
for this communication is not capable of handling the feedback
(too busy, overconﬁdent, ﬁxed ways of thinking, fear of being
wrong), then nothing will change. But the audience needs the sup-
port of respected peers and champions among senior managers to
ensure that learning has high priority and appropriate resources to
put the right people on the team and give them the time and tools
and the psychological safety to speak up. Lindoe et al. (this issue)
show that the internal audience, including senior managers, some-
times requires outside pressure from regulators and policymakers
to encourage change. As we look beyond a single organization to
the companies, unions, suppliers, contractors, regulators, legisla-
tors, and publics that comprise a system (see papers in this issue
by Hovden et al., Leveson, and Lindoe et al.), we realize that inci-
dent investigation is an opportunity for dialogue and collaborative
learning across groups and organizations that are often in conﬂict
yet need to work together more effectively on common problems.6. The future
The papers in this special issue illustrate the great progress and
the enduring challenges in the dozen years since NeTWork ﬁrst
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from operating experience. A dozen years from now, what do we
envision? If there were another NeTWork workshop, what would
have to happen to make it a celebration of success? First, we be-
lieve that industries will increasingly share the knowledge and
tools that are being developed. Even the most ‘‘advanced” indus-
tries (aviation, nuclear power) are still struggling with safety is-
sues, and those that once faced the most obvious safety
management challenges (health care, offshore oil and gas, trans-
portation) are learning new lessons daily. Research can accelerate
sharing by identifying more effective tools and the principles
underlying their success, as well as by developing a shared lan-
guage to ease transfer of knowledge. Engagement between
researchers and practitioners is a continuing legacy of Bernhard
Wilpert’s work. Second, the concepts and tools of systems safety
and systems thinking will be increasingly important as companies
and industries identify key hazards and the most effective ways to
remove and control risk. Research is needed to develop and opera-
tionalize comprehensive systems safety approaches that are prac-
tical and usable by diverse users in diverse settings. Third, systems
approaches will allow safety management to become increasingly
proactive, that is, learning from smaller and more distant incidents
and even from system models without having to wait for accidents
to provide the ‘‘gift of failure.” Research must help make the casethat safety management is good management, not simply a de-
fense against an intrusive regulator or a misinformed public. Final-
ly, systems approaches will encourage multiple stakeholders in the
system (regulators, companies, academics) to understand their
interdependent roles and to engage collaboratively in the learning
process. Research can help understand how leadership emerges
from different stakeholder groups with different amounts and
sources of power to guide the whole system.References
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